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PROTECTING THE LEAST OF THESE: A NEW 
APPROACH TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
PANDERING PROVISIONS 
STEPHEN T. FAIRCHILD† 
ABSTRACT 
 The pandering of child pornography—selling, distributing, or 
conveying the impression that one possesses sexually graphic images 
of children for sale or distribution—facilitates actual harm to 
children, such as molestation. Yet legislative attempts to curb 
pandering inevitably implicate concerns about panderers’ First 
Amendment rights. This Note argues that in balancing the 
vulnerability of children against the power of the First Amendment, 
the law must shift to focus more on the subject of this grievous 
harm—children. This approach will appropriately extend protection 
to a subset of the population that is least able to protect itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the Information Age has presented new 
battlefields for government regulation and individual rights to 
confront each other. Faced with mounting evidence of growth in 
Internet child pornography,1 Congress has enacted several bills 
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 1. See, e.g., Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and the Constitution: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 60–61 (2002) [hereinafter Stopping 
Child Pornography] (prepared statement of Ernest E. Allen, president and chief executive 
officer of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, and Daniel S. Armagh, 
director of the Legal Resource Division, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children) 
(testifying to 60,000 reports of child pornography in over four years since the establishment of 
an Internet “CyberTipline” site); see also infra Part I.A. 
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targeting the production, distribution, and advertising of this 
material.2 As justification, Congress based these laws on voluminous 
findings detailing how the market for child pornography has been 
fueled by the addition of materials that are easily produced using 
emerging technologies, how the Internet engenders evasive 
dissemination of these materials, and how these materials are linked 
to other harms to children such as sexual abuse.3 Even in the face of 
these compelling factual findings, however, many attempts at 
regulating the child pornography market have abutted an individual 
right that is equally compelling in American tradition—the First 
Amendment. In response to every law that Congress has passed to 
curb the further growth of child pornography, litigants have 
successfully raised claims that the law infringes on their fundamental 
right to express themselves, effectively arguing that child 
pornography is no less a valid mechanism of expression than 
provocative political blogs, advertising banners with potentially 
offensive messages at school-sanctioned events,4 or flag burning.5 
Because of the free speech interests that child pornography laws 
inevitably implicate, a large body of scholarship evaluates the 
interplay between such laws and the First Amendment.6 In particular, 
the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition,7 holding virtual child pornography to be a form of 
protected speech, engendered a great deal of discussion in the 
 
 2. E.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered sections 
of 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2004)); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009–26 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260 (2000), invalidated 
in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002)); see also infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622, 2629 (2007) (holding a student’s First 
Amendment rights were not violated when he was suspended after unfurling a banner that read 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”). 
 5. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (permitting flag burning as a means of 
political expression). 
 6. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Child Pornography Law and the Proliferation of the Sexualized 
Child, in CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION 228, 228 
(Robert Atkins & Svetlana Mintcheva eds., 2006) (asserting that “child pornography has 
spawned an extraordinary and troubling body of case law” under the First Amendment). 
Professor Adler notes, however, that the body of articles dealing with child pornography is 
rather limited compared to other areas of First Amendment law, and even student notes that 
treat the subject have often dealt with non-First Amendment issues such as statutory 
interpretation. Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 924–25 & 
n.15 (2001). 
 7. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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academic literature.8 In contrast, the effect of so-called “pandering 
provisions” has kindled little scholarship, in part because Free Speech 
Coalition touched only tangentially on them.9 One case dealt head-on 
with the federal pandering statute and found it both overbroad and 
vague under First Amendment precedent.10 The government’s strong 
interests in upholding pandering legislation together with the 
vigorous defense mounted by those accused of pandering make this a 
salient topic for legal exploration, especially given the wide-ranging 
impacts of this litigation on American communities. 
In the conflict between the power of the First Amendment and 
the protective intent of child pornography legislation (particularly 
pandering legislation), a focus on children as the object of the law’s 
shielding power is not only normatively ideal, but also constitutionally 
necessary. The Constitution’s guarantees of individual rights protect 
not just those who have the luxury to claim their succor, but also “the 
least of these”11—those vulnerable groups who may not even know 
they are entitled to the law’s protection. Part I of this Note 
documents the extent to which easy access to Internet child 
pornography has fueled a market for such material, and has enhanced 
the link between child pornography and the facilitation of other 
crimes against children such as molestation. Part I further submits 
that, though the vast majority of Americans finds child pornography 
unacceptable, social norming influences within the small, insular 
community of child pornography consumers create an impression that 
this type of behavior is natural.12 In Part II, the Note chronicles the 
 
 8. See generally Susan S. Kreston, Defeating the Virtual Defense in Child Pornography 
Prosecutions, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 49 (2004) (suggesting prosecutorial methods to prove that a 
child featured in pornographic material is real); Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Free Speech 
Seriously: The United States Supreme Court and Virtual Child Pornography, 1 FIRST 
AMENDMENT L. REV. 1 (2003) (praising the Supreme Court’s decision protecting virtual child 
pornography); Sara C. Marcy, Recent Development, Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is 
There Any Way Around Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2136 (2003) 
(chronicling the legislative response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act (CPPA) in Free Speech Coalition). 
 9. Pandering is “[t]he act or offense of selling or distributing textual or visual material 
(such as magazines or videotapes) openly advertised to appeal to the recipient’s sexual interest.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (8th ed. 2004). The federal pandering provision at issue in 
recent litigation is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 10. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 
S. Ct. 1874 (Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-694). 
 11. Matthew 25:40 (King James). 
 12. The passage of child pornography–protective legislation is not the imposition, by an 
especially vociferous interest group, of self-righteous moral norms on an unreceptive society. Cf. 
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ongoing seesaw between enactment of legislation designed to quell 
the demand factors that drive the market for child pornography (with 
an emphasis on pandering provisions), and the subsequent 
overturning of such legislation by the courts on First Amendment 
grounds. Part III offers a short critique of the reasoning in two such 
decisions. Part IV argues that, because children are a fundamentally 
different and more vulnerable subset of the population, a child-
centered re-conceptualization of this area of First Amendment 
jurisprudence is necessary to settle the free speech conflicts that 
pandering legislation presents. 
I.  THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. Child Pornography and Sexual Abuse of Children 
The majority of the American public opposes child 
pornography13 because the promulgation of sexual images involving 
those who are legally unable to consent harms children.14 Capturing 
children in sexually graphic poses recorded in a permanent medium 
stigmatizes the child subjects, who live with the specter of 
pornographic photos following them around for generations.15 
Moreover, though the definition of child pornography encompasses 
actions other than sexual intercourse,16 the production of child 
pornography often involves adults performing sexual acts with 
children, which constitutes a crime under relevant statutory rape 
laws.17 Thus, the use of children in sexually explicit material, 
 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582–83 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(decrying mere disapproval by the majority as a justification for morality-based legislation). 
Rather, the majority of the American people has, through legislative channels, identified a 
problem resulting in actual harm to children and attempted to take measures to remedy it. 
 13. Child pornography is statutorily defined, and will be used for purposes of this Note, as 
a visual depiction, if “the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A) (2000); id. § 2256(8)(A). A 
minor is “any person under the age of eighteen years.” Id. § 2256(1). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (2000) (Congressional Findings of the 104th Cong.) (“[W]here 
children are used in its production, child pornography permanently records the victim’s abuse, 
and its continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting 
those children in future years.”). 
 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 2004) (including “graphic or simulated 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person” in the definition of what 
constitutes “sexually explicit conduct”). 
 17. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (“A person is guilty of 
rape in the first degree when . . . [h]e engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is 
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according to Congress’s findings, itself constitutes sexual abuse.18 
Demand for these types of images is high, as evidenced by the size of 
the market: the most reliable estimates place the financial activity 
generated by child pornography in the multi-million dollar range, 
though some figures have placed that value in the billions.19 Congress 
has found a multi-million dollar interstate market for child 
pornography20 that harms children’s health and is detrimental to all of 
society.21 The Internet’s fast communications and relative anonymity 
make it easy to exchange this material with others who have the same 
interests. Although the precise volume of Internet sites dedicated to 
sharing child pornography is difficult to estimate due to the risks 
involved in revealing oneself as a consumer of this illegal product,22 
one child pornographer estimated the number of new posts to the 
most well-known child pornography Usenet group at between 5,000 
to 7,000 per week.23 In a year-long period between 2000 and 2001, 
United States law enforcement agencies arrested an estimated 2,577 
people for crimes involving online sexual exploitation of minors, of 
 
incapable of consent because he . . . [i]s less than twelve (12) years old.”); WASH. REV. CODE  
§ 9A.44.073(1) (2006) (“A person is guilty of rape of a child in the first degree when the person 
has sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the 
perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least twenty-four months older than the victim.”). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (2000) (Congressional Findings of the 104th Cong.) (“[T]he use 
of children in the production of sexually explicit material . . . is a form of sexual abuse which can 
result in physical or psychological harm, or both, to the children involved.”). 
 19. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 34 
(2001). 
 20. As Part I.B makes clear, a large swath of America disapproves of child pornography 
and presumably does not engage in it. If this is true, why does child pornography generate such 
a large market? One explanation is that even if relatively few people traffic in child 
pornography, they do so on a massive scale involving thousands of pictures for sale. But see id. 
at 91 (arguing that estimating the value of the child pornography “industry” is misleading 
because most people who trade child pornography, even if in large volumes, do so out of non-
economic motivations). 
 21. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,  
§ 501(1)(A), 120 Stat. 587, 623 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note) (“The illegal production, 
transportation, distribution, receipt, advertising and possession of child pornography . . . is 
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children depicted in child 
pornography and has a substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole.”); see also id.  
§ 501(1)(B) (“A substantial interstate market in child pornography exists, including not only a 
multimillion dollar industry, but also a nationwide network of individuals openly advertising 
their desire to exploit children and to traffic in child pornography.”). 
 22. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 56. 
 23. Id. at 55. 
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which 36 percent were for child pornography.24 Of those arrested, 
two-thirds had child pornography in their possession.25 One sting 
operation alone netted 125 subscribers to child pornography 
websites.26 
Even more troublesome is the clear causal link between the 
viewing of child pornography and child molestation. Though viewing 
child pornography does not, of course, inexorably lead to sex crimes 
against children, statistics suggest that the connection between 
viewing child pornography and committing subsequent sexual abuse 
against children is significant. One study cited in congressional 
testimony found that at least 80 percent of purchasers of child 
pornography actively abuse children,27 and “a 1984 study by the 
Chicago Police Department confirmed that in almost 100% of their 
annual child pornography arrests, detectives found photos, films, and 
videos of the arrested individual engaging in sex with other 
children.”28 A 2000 study by the Bureau of Prisons revealed that, of 
sixty-two offenders convicted of either child pornography or traveling 
to engage in sex with a minor, 76 percent admitted to prior 
unprosecuted sex crimes against children.29 A chief from the FBI’s 
Crimes Against Children Unit testified that “[t]here is a clear 
correlation between sexual abuse of children and the collection of 
child pornography,” and cited an FBI sting operation that netted 
ninety-two collectors of child pornography, thirteen of whom 
admitted having sexually molested forty-eight children total.30 He 
testified that images of child pornography “whet [child predators’] 
appetites for real world sexual encounters with children.”31 Thus, 
child pornography is causally linked to actual child molestation: 
 
 24. MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO & EOGHAN CASEY, INVESTIGATING CHILD 
EXPLOITATION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW, AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 9 
(2005). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Scout Leader, Counselor Arrested in Child-Porn Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 
2006, at A7. 
 27. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 1, at 65. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Enhancing Child Protection Laws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter 
Heimbach Statement] (statement of Michael J. Heimbach, unit chief, Crimes Against Children 
Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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“[Researchers] believe that child pornography is central to 
pedophiliac psychology, social orientation, and behavior. . . . The 
trading of pornography with other pedophiles may lead to exchanging 
victims for their sexual services.”32 
Thus, to say that child pornography is just another form of 
speech, worthy of protection under the First Amendment no matter 
how repugnant its message, is not accurate. Rather, child 
pornography is better described as a tool used to incite some cases of 
child molestation. This incitement facilitates more abuse by 
reinforcing the idea that it is acceptable for adults to have sexual 
relations with children—an illegal act recorded by much child 
pornography.33 Such imminently illegal incitement is never entitled to 
First Amendment protection.34 Furthermore, child molesters can use 
images of child pornography to become aroused, to persuade children 
to acquiesce in sexual activity, or to coerce the child into participating 
in sex through blackmail.35 Virtual child pornography,36 which 
constitutes protected speech under the Supreme Court’s Free Speech 
 
 32. DIANE SCHETKY & ARTHUR GREEN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK FOR 
HEALTH CARE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 154 (1988); see also KENNETH V. LANNING, 
CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS FOR LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
INVESTIGATING CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 31 (3d ed. 1992), available at http:// 
www.skeptictank.org/nc70.pdf (“The pedophile can also use the computer to troll for and 
communicate with potential victims with minimal risk of being identified. . . . The child can be 
indirectly ‘victimized’ through the transfer of sexually explicit information and material or the 
child can be evaluated for future face-to-face contact and direct victimization.”); id. at 28 (“[I]n 
most cases the arousal and fantasy fueled by [child] pornography is only a prelude to actual 
sexual activity with children.”). 
 33. Enhancing Child Protection Laws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 14 (2002) [hereinafter Allen 
Statement] (statement of Ernest E. Allen, president and chief executive officer, National Center 
for Missing & Exploited Children) (“[C]hild pornography is not like other speech. It is a 
molestation tool. It is a tool used by predators and pedophiles to seduce and manipulate, to 
break down inhibitions, to make sex between adults and children appear normal.”). 
 34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”). 
 35. Heimbach Statement, supra note 29, at 33; Allen Statement, supra note 33, at 29. 
 36. Virtual child pornography can include visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct 
when “such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image 
that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. IV 2004), or “such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or 
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” id.  
§ 2256(8)(C) (2000). 
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Coalition decision, can be used to lower children’s inhibitions in 
preparing them for sexual activity with adults.37 
Importantly, the criminal abuse of children is directly linked with 
the pandering of child pornography as well as the possession, 
production, and distribution of such material. Pandering is “[t]he act 
or offense of selling or distributing textual or visual material (such as 
magazines or videotapes) openly advertised to appeal to the 
recipient’s sexual interest.”38 Such advertising, even when there is no 
underlying material, can lead to the intent to commit sex crimes 
against children: 
[W]e are operating an undercover investigation after we took down 
a child pornography website. We actually, without putting any 
images up, gave the impression that we could provide that content. 
We had people sending us e-mail telling us that they wanted 
bestiality involving children. They wanted torture of pre-teen girls. 
We had people who were willing to pay to have sex with 
children. . . . [W]e arrested a 55-year-old man who owned a horse 
ranch in Detroit. He traveled to Dallas thinking he was going to 
have sex with an 8-year-old girl. He sent us child pornography 
electronically over the Internet before he arrived . . . to show to the 
children. He showed them pictures of himself exposed . . . .39 
Here, the man to whom the child pornography was pandered not only 
had imminent intent to have sex with an underage girl, but also 
actually committed a sex-related crime (indecent exposure). The 
advertising of child pornography materials, in this case, brought a 
pedophile to the brink of committing a sexual crime involving a 
minor, with only the intervention of law enforcement standing in his 
way. 
B. Social Norming 
Whether because of the links between child pornography and 
molestation, or because of shared moral concerns, a large majority of 
the American public opposes child pornography. When asked in a 
 
 37. Heimbach Statement, supra note 29, at 33. 
 38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 1142. 
 39. Enhancing Child Protection Laws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 14 (2002) (statement of William C. 
Walsh, lieutenant of police, Youth and Family Support Division, Dallas Police Dep’t (emphasis 
added)). 
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survey, “[s]ome 92% of Americans say they are concerned about 
child pornography on the Internet,” and 50 percent of Americans 
described child pornography as the most “heinous” online crime.40 In 
the psychological literature, pedophilia is a recognized disorder, and 
interest in child pornography is one manifestation of this disorder.41 
An American majority, recognizing the harms visited on children 
through this form of pornography, expressed itself through its 
legislators and enacted several rounds of legislation designed to 
condemn child pornography and to combat the problem.42 The 
government has a “compelling” interest in protecting children,43 and 
this legislation effectuates this protection. Typically, rational actors 
comport with this legislation because the costs of engaging in child 
pornography (be they morally or punitively based) far outweigh the 
benefits. The isolated nature of Internet communities, however, 
permits the development of communities whose members believe that 
the benefits of child pornography outweigh its costs. 
The influence of a large, diverse community in establishing social 
norms, and in determining sanctions for their transgression, is an 
important one. Sanctions are pervasive enforcement mechanisms for 
social norms, and the deterrent factor against breaking a norm is the 
potential shame or embarrassment that a transgressor might feel 
when exposed to society at large.44 Indeed, the law can act either to 
encourage the development of new norms45 or, more powerfully, to 
 
 40. Press Release, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Fear of Online Crime (Apr. 2, 
2001), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/press_release.asp?r=19. 
 41. Pedophilia, in AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 571 (4th ed. 2000). Individuals with pedophilia often do not 
feel negatively about their actions because it is an ego-indulging behavior. Id. 
 42. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(13), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (“In the 
absence of Congressional action, the difficulties in enforcing the child pornography laws will 
continue to grow increasingly worse.”); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 121(1)(1), 110 Stat. 3009–26 (“[T]he use of children in the production of sexually 
explicit material . . . is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or psychological harm, 
or both, to the children involved”); Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
500, § 702(2), 100 Stat. 1783–74 (“Congress has recognized the physiological, psychological, and 
emotional harm caused by the production, distribution, and display of child pornography by 
strengthening laws prescribing [sic] such activity . . . .”). 
 43. See infra Part II.A. 
 44. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915 (1996); 
see also id. at 944 (“Feelings of moral culpability are tightly connected with prevailing social 
norms.”). 
 45. See id. at 958 (“[R]egulation might even consist of direct coercion, designed to generate 
good norms or to pick up the slack in their absence.”). 
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shape preexisting norms in such a way that people will consistently 
obey them because of the law’s powerful coercive effect.46 Yet some 
members of society gain utility through deviating from the norm.47 
More specifically, a law might express a general consensus 
against treating people as objects—such as prohibiting the sale of 
children—because society desires to deter, with official penalties for 
violations, this type of thinking that violates deontological norms.48 
Congress, recognizing the established norms of the American public, 
enacted laws relating to child pornography to give meaningful 
enforcement to morally and empirically based attitudes against the 
viewing and dissemination of such material and in favor of protecting 
the children involved in its production. 
Child pornographers do not often participate in the larger norms 
community that disapproves of their stock-in-trade.49 In fact, the 
potential anonymity offered by the Internet provides child 
pornographers with a means to opt out of established social norms; 
instead, their interactions are limited to the comparatively smaller 
realm of other child pornographers, who provide a supportive 
environment that reinforces their actions.50 They are able to isolate 
 
 46. See id. at 958–59 (“[Laws] have an effect in shaping social norms and social meanings. 
They do this in large part because there is a general norm in favor of obeying the law.”). 
 47. Id. at 918–19. The reasons behind this increased utility vary, but may include 
disparagement of the norm’s worth based upon one’s own valuation of it, expression of 
defiance, and/or communication of individual preferences. Id. 
 48. Id. at 964. 
 49. Presumably, if child pornographers regularly participated in extra-legislative 
institutions of civil society (churches, town hall meetings, community recreational activities, and 
the like), they would encounter numerous others who would express revulsion at the 
pornographers’ activities. It would take an especially obstreperous objector to an established 
norm to say, “99 out of 100 people, whom I respect well enough to spend a great deal of time 
with, think that my activities cause unacceptable amounts of harm to children—yet I will not 
allow this attitude to change my behavior in the slightest.” For commentary on an increasing 
trend of isolation and detachment from civic commitments in American society, see generally 
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000). 
 50. Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 549 (2006) (“An Internet-based community, because it permits people to 
isolate themselves into self-reinforcing groups defined by a single shared interest, can create an 
atmosphere in which members perceive that there is greater lawlessness than actually exists.”). 
Furthermore, not only can producers of child pornography themselves hide behind the 
Internet’s anonymous façade, but the pandering of child pornography can also minimize the 
transaction costs to criminals of gaining new information on the availability of their desired 
materials: “The tools of globalization—mainly the Internet, which offers anonymous, 
asynchronous communication—also offer offenders a way to obtain expertise at almost no 
cost.” Id. at 542. 
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themselves from other members of society whose opprobrium could 
deter their conduct. Thus, they lose the benefit of other influences 
which could shape their perceptions of the inappropriateness of their 
behavior, and they also begin to believe that their narrow interest is 
reflective of society as a whole.51 Their existence in small Internet 
communities contributes to a renorming process whereby a behavior 
traditionally condemned as unacceptable (viewing, producing, or 
disseminating child pornography) becomes acceptable by virtue of the 
limited community in which it is practiced. 
One competing view of Internet communities regards them as 
facilitative, creating opportunities for interaction with wide varieties 
of people online without regard to race or gender, and dismisses as 
“dystopian” those who lament the loss of face-to-face interaction with 
human beings.52 But any such heightened online interaction, as well as 
the development of “broadly supportive communities of intimacy,”53 
depends on an affirmative choice by the population subset at issue—
in this case, child pornographers—to engage with individuals holding 
vastly different views than them. To the extent that child 
pornographers choose to remain in meaningful contact only with 
other child pornographers, they lack connections with other “social 
milieus” and give in to the dominance of their particular online 
realm.54 The mere fact of a community’s existence does not qualify the 
community as good; one conception of a good community might 
balance protection of individual autonomy with formation of bonds to 
other people and view dimly the arbitrary exclusion of potential 
 
 51. As Keenan explains, 
Largely because of the Internet, new communities abound. Traditional communities, 
because they were defined mostly by geography, included people with a variety of 
interests. On the Internet, new communities include people who may share only one 
interest. . . . Such narrow communities are not necessarily bad—one can imagine 
communities devoted to backgammon or quilting—but they can also be havens for 
individuals whose preferences put them at odds with the geographic community in 
which they live or the larger society. 
Id. at 548. 
 52. Barry Wellman & Keith Hampton, Living Networked On and Offline, 28 CONTEMP. 
SOCIOLOGY 648, 649 (1999). Notably, the authors also acknowledge that the lack of any direct 
feedback in online communications condones the creation of messages that individuals would 
not normally say to others in person. Id. at 650. 
 53. Id. at 651. 
 54. But cf. id. at 652 (“[Living in computer-supported social networks] enhances the ability 
to connect with a large number of social milieus, while decreasing involvement in any one 
milieu.”). 
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members from its ranks.55 Thus, as long as the insular community of 
child pornographers disregards the disapprobation of a broader swath 
of society, it functions only as a self-interested and isolated minority. 
The establishment of law-backed norms against child 
pornography in its various forms thus stems not from a “feel good” 
impulse on society’s part, but from an empirically-based awareness 
that child pornography actually harms children. Furthermore, it is 
child pornographers who isolate themselves from the broad norms 
community that condemns their work. Yet these individuals have 
convinced themselves that their behavior is normal, in part by 
participating solely in smaller, self-reinforcing norms communities. 
Child pornography legislation, discussed in Part II, gives force to the 
large-scale societal consensus against child pornography. Often, 
however, child pornographers succeed in challenging these efforts on 
First Amendment grounds. 
II.  CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 
A. The Evolution of Child Pornography Law 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”56 This promise of protected 
expression exists, among many other reasons, to protect the right to 
speak one’s conscience freely and to encourage public dialogue 
concerning a wide variety of views, even if those views are considered 
vile and repugnant at the time of their airing.57 Although the First 
Amendment operates by extending immunity from government 
regulation to certain forms of speech, obscene speech is an area 
unprotected by the First Amendment. In Miller v. California,58 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed an earlier case, Roth v. United States,59 in 
determining that states could permissibly regulate obscene matter.60 
The Miller Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether 
given matter was obscene: whether the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, would find that the whole work 
 
 55. Amitai Etzioni, Creating Good Communities and Good Societies, 29 CONTEMP. 
SOCIOLOGY 188, 189–90 (2000). 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 57. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 58. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 59. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 60. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. 
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appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work describes sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way; and whether the whole work 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.61 Under this 
definition, certain materials, even though they depicted sexual 
conduct, could be protected speech as long as they had the types of 
value that the Court mentioned; thus, a medical textbook focusing on 
anatomy and depicting a sex act could be immune from regulation.62 
The Court left open the question of whether depictions of sexual acts 
involving minors, even if they had artistic or literary merit, could 
nonetheless be prohibited by the government.63 
Child pornography first gained widespread attention as a social 
issue in the mid-1970s.64 Legislatures at the state and federal levels 
began to enact laws designed to curb the emerging problem.65 In 1982, 
the Supreme Court heard the first challenge to a child pornography 
law in New York v. Ferber.66 A Manhattan bookseller, Paul Ferber, 
was convicted under New York’s child pornography law67 for selling 
to an undercover agent two films of young boys engaging in sexual 
acts.68 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and 
overturned Ferber’s conviction on two grounds.69 First, the court 
found the New York statute underinclusive because it did not 
prohibit the distribution of films of other dangerous activity not 
involving minors.70 Additionally, because the statute’s language could 
include materials produced outside New York State, as well as 
materials containing adolescent sex in a non-obscene manner, the 
court found the statute overbroad.71 
 
 61. Id. at 24. 
 62. Id. at 26. 
 63. Although the dissent considered the question of whether state regulation of the 
distribution of sexually oriented material to minors would be permissible, id. at 47 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting), it did not address the issue of whether the content of the material included sexually 
explicit acts involving minors. 
 64. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 4. 
 65. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977) (“[Child] pornography and child prostitution 
have become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide 
scale.”). 
 66. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 67. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (Consol. 2006). 
 68. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751–52. 
 69. Id. at 752–53. 
 70. Id. at 752. 
 71. Id. at 752–53. 
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Even though “[t]he Court of Appeals’ assumption was not 
unreasonable in light of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions,”72 the U.S. 
Supreme Court framed the issue differently from the court of appeals, 
and treated child pornography as a category distinct from regular 
obscenity, which was governed by the Miller test.73 Writing for the 
majority, Justice White enumerated several reasons why “[s]tates are 
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic 
depictions of children,” even at the risk of suppressing some 
protected expression.74 First, the Court noted that states have a 
compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological 
well-being of a minor.”75 That very compelling interest justified 
protecting children, even to the detriment of other constitutionally 
protected rights.76 The Court held that preventing children from being 
sexually exploited and abused fell within the state’s compelling 
interest.77 The Court deferred to the New York legislature’s findings 
that involvement in child pornography was harmful to a child’s 
health,78 and cited several studies documenting the harmful effects of 
sexual exploitation on children later in life and linking children’s 
sexual performances in pornographic materials to molestation by 
adults.79 
Second, the Court held that a state could regulate child 
pornography’s dissemination in the interest of closing the distribution 
network for material involving sexual exploitation of children.80 Given 
that the state could identify children as compelling objects of the 
law’s protection, the Court reasoned that the only way to effectively 
enforce the protection of children would be to eliminate the market 
for such material by heavily penalizing its distribution or promotion.81 
The Court’s third justification recognized that the advertising of 
 
 72. Id. at 753. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 756. 
 75. Id. at 756–57. 
 76. Id. at 757. The Court noted the prevalence of child-protecting legislation in other First 
Amendment conflicts such as statutes prohibiting children’s distribution of literature on the 
street, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and protecting children from being exposed 
to non-obscene literature, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 77. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”). 
 78. Id. at 757–58. 
 79. Id. at 758 n.9. 
 80. Id. at 759. 
 81. Id. at 760. 
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materials containing child pornography was inherent in the 
production of these already illegal materials.82 Thus, advertising child 
pornography was a type of conduct inevitably incident to and 
facilitative of its illegal production.83 Finally, irrespective of whether 
the visual material in child pornography was legally obscene,84 the 
Court held that its value was “exceedingly modest, if not de 
minimis,”85 and that recognition of child pornography as a category of 
speech outside the First Amendment’s protection was consistent with 
stare decisis.86 The Court ultimately held that the New York statute 
was not impermissibly overbroad, as only a “tiny fraction” of the 
materials prohibited by the statute would actually be legitimate 
depictions of child sexual performances (such as in medical 
textbooks).87 
Though Ferber stood for a wide-ranging state ability to ban the 
dissemination of child pornography, the New York statute at issue did 
not deal with private possession of materials depicting sexual acts 
involving minors. Possession of obscenity involving exclusively adult 
actors was legal even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.88 
The Court considered the possession of child pornography for the 
first time in Osborne v. Ohio,89 and held that states could permissibly 
ban possession of these materials.90 Drawing on many of the same 
rationales the Court used in Ferber, Justice White wrote for the 
majority that because there remained a compelling state interest in 
protecting minors, the state could decrease demand for child 
pornography by proscribing its possession.91 This compelling interest 
could justify a state’s attempt to eliminate child pornography at all 
levels of distribution, not just dissemination or sale.92 The Court 
 
 82. Id. at 761–62. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 762 n.15. In fact, the Court held that “[t]he test for child pornography is separate 
from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller.” Id. at 764. 
 85. Id. at 762. 
 86. Id. at 763 (noting that “[t]he question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the 
First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech” and citing libel as an 
unprotected category of speech). 
 87. Id. at 773–74. 
 88. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (“[T]he mere private possession of obscene 
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.”). 
 89. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 90. Id. at 111. 
 91. Id. at 109–10. 
 92. Id. at 110. 
04__FAIRCHILD.DOC 11/1/2007 3:19:17 PM 
178 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:163 
reiterated the justifications it had found persuasive in Ferber: because 
child pornography leaves a permanent record of child abuse, and 
because there is a link between these materials and sexual abuse, 
banning possession of this pornography appropriately discouraged its 
production.93 
B. Child Pornography Law in the Digital Age: The Child 
Pornography Prevention Act and Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition 
As a result of the Ferber and Osborne decisions, child 
pornography remained a mostly limited, underground phenomenon 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.94 Enhanced law enforcement 
efforts increased the transaction costs to child pornography 
consumers of dealing in these materials,95 while Congress, particularly 
emboldened by Ferber, strengthened the prohibition against 
disseminating child pornography by increasing its minimum 
punishment from two to five years.96 For a while, it appeared that the 
market for child pornography had shriveled nearly to the point of 
extinction.97 
The Internet explosion of the mid-1990s caught legislators and 
law enforcement by surprise. The number of host computers on the 
Internet exploded from 300 in 1981 to 9,400,000 in 1996.98 In a ten-
year period, the number of host computers increased by a factor of 
150.99 Additionally, new technologies emerged that made it possible 
for child pornographers to produce images that appeared to be 
 
 93. Id. at 111. 
 94. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 39–40. 
 95. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 24, at 11. 
 96. Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 704(b), 100 Stat. 1783–
75. The minimum sentence for distribution, transportation, sale, intent to sell, or knowing 
receipt, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(3) (2000), was increased to fifteen years for repeat offenders of 
crimes against children by the PROTECT Act. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end 
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21,  
§ 103(b)(1)(C)(iii), 117 Stat. 650, 653. 
 97. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 40. In what was perhaps a harbinger of the technological 
explosion to come, however, electronic bulletin boards (a precursor of sorts to the World Wide 
Web) kept communications alive between those interested in swapping child pornography. The 
limited technological capabilities of computing at that time, though, rendered the digital transfer 
of pornographic images between users infeasible. Id. at 41–45. 
 98. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). 
 99. See Krista Ostertag, The Net’s Come a Long Way, Baby, VARBUSINESS, Nov. 1, 1997, 
at 115. 
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children engaging in sexual acts, but were created entirely by 
computer and did not involve any actual children—so-called “virtual” 
child pornography.100 Child pornographers could mount an affirmative 
defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(b)101 by proving 
that the images of children used in pornographic material were not 
real.102 This tactic presented an overwhelming challenge to law 
enforcement, as even skilled online agents could not distinguish 
between a virtual “child” and a real child victim of sexual 
exploitation.103 
Accordingly, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996 (CPPA) to respond to these emerging technologies.104 It 
amended the definitions of child pornography in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) 
to include “any visual depiction, including any photography, film, 
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture” 
that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”105 Congress intended the “appears to be” language to 
include computer-generated images that were indistinguishable from 
real children. Additionally, Congress added statutory language that 
banned the pandering of such visual depictions by including within 
the definition of child pornography any visual depictions that were 
“advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a 
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a 
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”106 
 
 100. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 7 (1996). 
 101. This statute provides punishment for anyone who 
knowingly possesses any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, 
or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been 
mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, 
including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, 
or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including 
by computer . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2000). 
 102. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 72 (1996) (statement of Bruce A. Taylor, president and chief 
counsel, National Law Center for Children and Families) (“Under present law, the Government 
must prove that every piece of child pornography . . . is of a real minor being sexually 
exploited.”). 
 103. See id. at 70 (“If a computer generated counterfeit picture of a child engaged in sex is 
so good a fake that you cannot tell by looking at it, then police, courts, and indeed pedophiles 
and seduced children would also be unable to know the difference.”). 
 104. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009–
26. 
 105. Id. § 121(2)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009–28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)). 
 106. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000)). 
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The sweep of the CPPA’s language potentially included images 
in which no child was harmed. Indeed, Congress identified a probable 
First Amendment conflict in this area, as the statute could have 
reached some images to which the Supreme Court had extended First 
Amendment protection.107 In the case that would become Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, a group of artists and film producers, fearing 
the statute’s language would prohibit their legitimate work,108 filed 
suit against the government shortly after the CPPA’s passage. They 
alleged that the “appears to be” language of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), 
as well as the “conveys the impression” pandering provision in  
§ 2256(8)(D), were overbroad and chilled their valid expression of 
works protected by the First Amendment.109 After the Ninth Circuit 
reversed a lower court decision and found the CPPA facially 
invalid,110 the government appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Free Speech Coalition holding that engendered the most 
controversy was the Supreme Court’s affirmation that § 2256(8)(B) 
was overbroad.111 The Court held, first, that the CPPA provided no 
protection to images that were non-obscene under the Miller test; in 
fact, the CPPA made no reference to the Miller test at all.112 As a 
result, images containing teenagers engaged in sexual activity that had 
artistic merit—for example, a rendition of Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet—could fall under the CPPA’s prohibitions even though they 
violated no contemporary community standards of decency.113 The 
Court also rejected the rationale offered by the government for 
prohibiting virtual child pornography: that such images “whet[] the 
 
 107. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 28–30 (1996). The Supreme Court held in Ferber that the 
distribution of non-obscene depictions of sexual conduct not involving live performances was 
still protected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764–65 (1982). 
 108. The group, Free Speech Coalition’s respondents, included a painter of nudes, an erotic 
photographer, and the publisher of a naturist-oriented book. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234, 243 (2002). The respondents made clear that their work did not include child 
pornography, and that they opposed child pornography by offering a reward for information 
leading to the arrest of persons involved in its production. Brief for Respondents at 9–10, Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795). 
 109. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 243. 
 110. Id. (citing Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)). Yet four other 
federal circuit courts sustained the CPPA in separate cases: United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 
402–03 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 921 (4th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir. 1999); and United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
 111. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256; see also sources cited supra note 8. 
 112. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246. 
 113. Id. at 246–47. 
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appetite”114 of child molesters and encourage them to commit illegal 
sexual acts with children.115 The Court noted that “[t]he mere 
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient 
reason for banning it”116 nor could speech be banned because it had 
the potential to increase the chances of an unlawful act being 
committed at an indeterminate point in the future.117 The majority 
perceived no more than a tenuous connection between child 
pornography and any actual molestation that might result from it.118 
Finally, the Court rejected the government’s “market deterrence” 
rationale (that eliminating virtual child pornography would dry up the 
market for actual child pornography) because there was no 
underlying crime in virtual child pornography’s production; no actual 
children were abused.119 
Significantly, however, the Supreme Court also struck down the 
CPPA pandering provision in § 2256(8)(D).120 The majority held that 
the “conveys the impression” language was overbroad because it 
could reach material that actually contained no sexually explicit 
content, but whose advertising merely gave the impression that such 
content was present.121 The Court acknowledged Congress’s extensive 
findings detailing the problems posed by materials looking like child 
pornography, but made no findings addressing the dangers posed by 
pandering materials.122 Section 2256(8)(D) also reached beyond the 
rationale for regulating pandering set forth by Ginzburg v. United 
States123 because there was no requirement that the material must 
 
 114. Id. at 253. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 253–54. 
 119. Id. at 254. The Court added that law enforcement difficulties in distinguishing between 
real and virtual children also did not justify the CPPA, as it was impermissible to ban protected 
speech to eradicate unprotected speech. Id. at 254–55. 
 120. Id. at 258. 
 121. Id. at 257. The Court gave the example of a movie containing no sexually explicit 
scenes involving minors, but with previews conveying the impression that such scenes were in 
the movie, being treated as child pornography. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg, the defendant had been 
convicted of sending an obscene publication through the mail; the prosecution relied on the 
manner in which the defendant advertised the publications to prove their obscene content. Id. at 
464, 467–70. The Court held that, in close cases, the manner in which a publication was 
advertised could be probative of that publication’s obscenity. Id. at 470. 
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have been pandered in a commercial context.124 Thus, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress’s first attempt at regulating the pandering of 
child pornography was overbroad and violated the First Amendment. 
C. Pandering Provisions and the Law: The PROTECT Act and 
United States v. Williams 
Congress licked its wounds from the Supreme Court’s rebuke in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and immediately set to work 
drafting new legislation that would address the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment objections to the CPPA, yet at the same time provide 
robust prosecution of those who sustained the market for child 
pornography. The result was the PROTECT Act of 2003, signed into 
law by President Bush on April 30, 2003.125 The law acknowledged the 
Free Speech Coalition decision, but recognized that its impact had 
made prosecutions of child pornography defendants extremely 
difficult by forcing the government to overcome a “virtual porn 
defense.”126 To comport with Free Speech Coalition, the PROTECT 
Act changed the language in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) to prohibit visual 
depictions “that [are] of, or [are] virtually indistinguishable from that 
of, an actual minor.”127 The Act also attempted to respond to the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the CPPA’s pandering provision by 
substituting what Congress thought was more narrowly tailored 
language, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B). The new law 
punished anyone who knowingly 
advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the 
mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including 
by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that 
reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that 
the material or purported material is, or contains (i) an obscene 
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or 
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.128 
 
 124. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258. 
 125. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
 126. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 45 (2003). 
 127. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added). Congress intended an objective, reasonable person 
standard—an ordinary observer—in determining whether a “virtually indistinguishable” 
depiction looked like an actual child. Id. at 7. 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added). 
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In drafting this provision to comply with the Supreme Court’s 
decision, Congress (perhaps unwittingly) resurrected the market 
deterrence rationale rejected in Free Speech Coalition, justifying the 
new pandering provision on the ground that “even fraudulent offers 
to buy or sell unprotected child pornography help to sustain the 
illegal market for this material.”129 Congress also believed the 
pandering provision was crucial to help prosecutors to pursue 
possessors of actual child pornography whom they could not reach by 
other statutes.130 Yet the new language still did not escape First 
Amendment concerns. A group of senators noted the objection of a 
leading First Amendment scholar that the “purported material” 
language tipped the whole Act “over the constitutional edge,”131 and 
observed themselves that the lack of a nexus between the pandering 
of obscenity and any actual obscene material endangered the validity 
of the entire provision.132 A letter written by the American Civil 
Liberties Union pointed out that the distribution of protected speech 
could be punished merely because of its marketing, and criminal 
liability did not require underlying obscene material.133 Despite these 
objections, however, the final version of the PROTECT Act included 
the pandering provision.134 
These lurking First Amendment infirmities came back to haunt 
Congress and the PROTECT Act in a 2006 case, United States v. 
Williams.135 The defendant, Michael Williams, had posted a message 
in an Internet chat room giving the impression that he possessed child 
pornography.136 An undercover agent engaged the defendant in an 
Internet chat, culminating in the defendant posting a hyperlink which 
led to images of actual minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.137 
Williams was charged with possessing child pornography and with 
 
 129. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 12 (2003). 
 130. Id. at 23–24. 
 131. Id. at 24 (quoting Professor Frederick Schauer). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. app. at 32. 
 134. The inclusion of these problematic provisions, despite arguments in the record against 
them, probably resulted from a combination of legislative compromise and a rush to get the 
statute codified. See id. at 24 (“We do not want to put child porn convictions on hold while we 
wait another six years to see if the law will survive constitutional scrutiny.”). 
 135. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1874 
(Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-694). 
 136. The message read: “Dad of toddler has ‘good’ pics of her an [sic] me for swap of your 
toddler pics, or live cam.” Id. at 1288. 
 137. Id. at 1289. 
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pandering it under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).138 He entered a 
conditional guilty plea and subsequently challenged the pandering 
provision’s constitutionality in the Eleventh Circuit on grounds of 
overbreadth and vagueness.139 
The Eleventh Circuit started with Williams’s overbreadth 
challenge. Though the court recognized that the government may 
prohibit commercial speech that is false or proposes an illegal 
transaction,140 The court held that Williams’s pander was non-
commercial and could not be regulated under the “fighting words” 
incitement doctrine.141 The absence of a statutory link to content was 
also problematic, as speech promoting alleged material could be 
criminalized even if the material was non-pornographic or 
nonexistent.142 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit held that courts could 
not criminalize subjective beliefs that materials contained child 
pornography based on the way in which they were communicated.143 
The court rejected the notion that pandering could be a stand-alone 
offense under Ginzburg v. United States, and reemphasized the Free 
Speech Coalition holding that Ginzburg only applied in a commercial 
context.144 
The court also found unconvincing the market deterrence 
rationale advanced by the government in this case and discussed 
during Congress’s deliberations over the PROTECT Act. The 
Eleventh Circuit determined that Congress’s link between pandering 
and stamping out the market for child pornography was empirically 
inadequate.145 Although Congress cited a compelling interest in 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1297. The court pointed out that, even in a commercial pandering situation, the 
only person able to complain about false advertising of a desired product would be the intended 
purchaser of child pornography—hardly the basis for a legitimate claim. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1298. This doctrine prohibits government limitations on speech unless the speech 
can be shown to incite imminent unlawful conduct. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 
(1969); see also supra text accompanying note 34. The fact that the Court found Williams’s 
pander did not imminently incite illegal activity does not preclude the probability that some 
child pornography pandering, and perhaps a substantial amount, may still in fact be inciteful and 
therefore subject to restriction under Brandenburg. See Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298 (“The First 
Amendment plainly protects speech advocating, encouraging or approving of otherwise illegal 
activity, so long as it does not rise to ‘fighting words status.’” (emphasis added)). 
 142. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298. 
 143. See id. at 1299 (“In this case . . . the law does not seek to attach liability to the materials, 
but to the ideas and images communicated to the viewer by those materials.”). 
 144. Id. at 1301. 
 145. Id. at 1303. 
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protecting children from sexual predators, the court failed to find a 
close nexus between this interest and preventing the pandering of 
child pornography, even given Ferber’s allowance of market 
deterrence as a justification for eliminating the profit motive for 
exploiting real children.146 Any aid to prosecutors in virtual 
pornography cases also did not justify the establishment of pandering 
provisions; such aid revived the rejected market proliferation 
rationale and targeted lawful speech (the communication of one’s 
thoughts about material) to prohibit unlawful speech.147 According to 
the Eleventh Circuit, the government could not use the pandering 
provision as a crutch to prove the existence of real children in 
pornographic materials.148 
Williams also prevailed on his vagueness challenge. The court 
focused on the lack of an underlying material requirement in the 
pandering statute. The “reflects the belief”149 language could establish 
criminal liability based on the communication of perverse thought 
alone, regardless of whether that thought related to child 
pornography.150 Furthermore, the obscurity of the statute’s intent 
requirement allowed the provision to potentially criminalize a 
possessor of cute children’s photographs who, by his promotion of the 
materials, merely intended to convey a naughty double-entendre.151 
Because the provision provided no affirmative defense that there 
were no underlying pornographic materials, people who (for 
admittedly base reasons) intended to give the impression that they 
possessed child pornography, even when they possessed nothing at 
all, could also have been exposed to criminal liability.152 
Thus, each legislative attempt to combat child pornography has 
met with First Amendment-based setbacks in the courts. This has 
been consistently true of pandering provisions. Though such 
provisions have attempted to serve the congressional goal (and public 
objective)153 of eliminating the market for child pornography, their 
reach has strayed into areas of speech protected by the First 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1303–04. 
 148. Id. at 1304. 
 149. Id. at 1306 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1306–07. 
 152. Id. at 1307. 
 153. See supra Part I.B. 
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Amendment. Part III focuses on pandering provisions specifically, 
highlighting some elements of Free Speech Coalition and Williams in 
which the courts’ reasoning was unconvincing. 
III.  EVALUATING THE FREE SPEECH COALITION  
AND WILLIAMS DECISIONS 
Nine Supreme Court justices in Free Speech Coalition, and a 
three-judge appellate panel in Williams, faced the delicate task of 
balancing the cherished freedoms of the First Amendment against the 
real harms to children caused by child pornography. Both cases came 
down on the side of the First Amendment, and as a result, lessened 
the protection of children against forces that enhanced the market for 
child pornography—particularly pandering. Although these jurists 
most likely had benign motives and reached their decisions after 
careful deliberation and weighing of the competing interests of both 
cases, elements of both opinions disregard salient equities that favor 
the government’s defense of anti-child pornography laws. 
In Free Speech Coalition, the government presented all the 
evidence it could possibly muster before the Supreme Court, offering 
congressional records,154 legislative findings,155 amicus briefs,156 and 
quantitative evidence157 to defend the CPPA’s constitutionality—and 
still lost. According to the Court, “[t]he Government has shown no 
more than a remote connection between speech that might encourage 
thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.”158 The majority 
demanded a “significantly stronger, more direct connection” to 
accept a market deterrence rationale of prohibiting virtual child 
 
 154. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 270 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that the legislative history makes clear that Congress did not intend the CPPA to 
apply to works of art, as the majority feared). 
 155. See id. at 244–45 (majority opinion) (“In its legislative findings, Congress recognized 
that there are subcultures of persons who harbor illicit desires for children and commit criminal 
acts to gratify the impulses.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Brief of the States of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-795) (advocating deference to the “extensive 
testimony and written materials” that Congress used in considering the CPPA). The amicus 
brief further recognized that children “are the ‘most vulnerable and defenseless’ members of 
our society.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 376 (N.J. 1995)). 
 157. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 245 (citing WALTER R. MCDONALD & ASSOCS., 
INC. & AM. HUMANE SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. OF 
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORT 1999 (documenting that 
93,000 children were victims of sexual abuse in one year alone)). 
 158. Id. at 253. 
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pornography on the ground that it encourages pedophiles to commit 
abuse.159 
This rhetoric begs the question of exactly how much convincing 
evidence it will take for the government to mount a successful 
defense of any legislation targeted at the child pornography market. 
In congressional hearings leading up to the CPPA, one national 
expert on child abuse testified to a faux-pander that attracted one 
man who made clear his imminent intent to have sex with children.160 
Data closely linked the possession and purchase of child 
pornography—that is, the creation of a market for it—with abuse of 
children.161 The Supreme Court refused to defer to Congress’s 
extensive findings in this case despite sufficient evidence for the 
Court to find in favor of the government. This pattern has repeated in 
other significant cases.162 Is the Court looking for a specific form of 
test that shows—through, say, multivariable regressions and standard 
deviations—an unassailable link between pandering and increased 
demand for child pornography? If it is impossible to even glean such 
evidence, it is disingenuous for the Court to keep insisting that the 
government cannot prove that link.163 And because of the clandestine 
nature of the child pornography market, it may indeed be nearly 
impossible to gather such evidence to the Court’s satisfaction.164 
If the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition was ignorant, 
willfully or not, of Congress’s findings, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Williams ignored a crucial fact of the case that should have made its 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 161. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628–36 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for ignoring Congress’s “mountain of data” demonstrating the national 
extent of rape and domestic violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616–17 (1995) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he determination [of an activity’s effect on interstate commerce] 
requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make 
with accuracy.”). Justice Breyer noted in Lopez that “reports, hearings and other readily 
available literature make clear that the problem of guns in and around schools is widespread 
and extremely serious,” id. at 619, and provided a lengthy appendix, containing over one 
hundred of these sources, of which the majority could have availed itself, id. at 631–44. 
 163. Admittedly, the rationale of Morrison indicates that increasing an already sizeable 
legislative record may accomplish precisely nothing. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (majority 
opinion) (“In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is 
supported by numerous findings . . . . But the existence of congressional findings is not 
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”). 
 164. Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996: Confronting the 
Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 639, 661 (1999). 
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disposition facile. Williams was not just making an empty pander; he 
actually possessed real child pornography.165 The Eleventh Circuit 
made much of its objection that the paucity of a statutory link to 
actual content rendered the PROTECT Act invalid for vagueness.166 
But with Williams, actual content was present, rendering irrelevant 
one of the court’s overbreadth concerns.167 If the Eleventh Circuit 
wanted to attack the PROTECT Act for First Amendment 
unconstitutionality ab initio, it could have at least chosen a more 
sympathetic defendant—one not in possession of actual child 
pornography.168 That the court found compelling Williams’s argument 
that he was “victimized” by an overbroad pandering statute, even 
when he was pandering material that he possessed, smacks of a 
certain cynicism about Congress’s motives in passing the PROTECT 
Act to curtail the market for child pornography. 
IV.  A NEW VISION FOR CHILDREN, 
PANDERING, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Reconceptualizing the Doctrine 
The Williams decision is not authoritative in all jurisdictions; the 
Supreme Court could either accept or reject its reasoning. Yet even if 
the Supreme Court overturns Williams and upholds the PROTECT 
Act’s pandering provision as constitutional, a new approach to 
evaluating pandering-versus-free speech conflicts, based upon a child-
centered approach to this area of First Amendment law, would 
obviate the need for the back-and-forth between legislatures and 
courts in trying to decide the constitutionality of future pandering 
provisions. 
 
 165. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 
1874 (Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-694) (“[Williams’s] computer hyperlink contained, among other 
things, seven images of actual minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”). 
 166. Id. at 1306 (“[T]he law does not require the pandered material to contain any particular 
content nor, in fact, that any ‘purported’ material need actually exist.”). 
 167. Id. at 1298–99 (“Because no regard is given to the actual nature or even the existence of 
the underlying material, liability can be established based purely on promotional speech 
reflecting the deluded belief that real children are depicted in legal child erotica . . . .”). Williams 
had more than a belief—he knew that his material was illegal child pornography. See id. at 1288–
89 (describing Williams’s online comments and actions). 
 168. Even though Williams challenged the statute facially, rather than as applied, id. at 1296, 
a more compelling case would have been made by a defendant who possessed no child 
pornography whatsoever but gave the impression that he had such materials merely to create a 
titillating impression in the reader’s mind, id. at 1307. 
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The prevailing approach to pandering is panderer-oriented, 
based on the rights that the panderer draws from the First 
Amendment. Thus, panderers—including actual child 
pornographers—can mount a successful claim that anti-pandering 
statutes violate their inherent rights to self-expression, even if the 
manner of that expression happens to offend a majority of people.169 
The right to express one’s thoughts, regardless of the merit of their 
contents, is not trivial; self-expression is at the heart of freedom of 
conscience and democratic participation.170 Indeed, a democratic 
society demands a dialectic between prevailing attitudes and 
unpopular views, encouraging frank discussion toward the aim of 
synthesizing consensus on a norm.171 The First Amendment is a 
powerful and necessary guarantor of this potential for self-expression. 
Yet it is precisely the First Amendment’s power that makes it 
dangerous in the hands of those who wield it to do harm, and for 
exactly that reason, the First Amendment has not proved an absolute 
bulwark against every form of expression in every circumstance.172 
National security has trumped individual First Amendment rights 
when a clear and present danger threatened the nation.173 The right to 
engage freely in commercial speech does not extend to false 
advertising or proposed illegal transactions,174 and as demonstrated in 
 
 169. See id. at 1298 (“The First Amendment plainly protects speech advocating or 
encouraging or approving of otherwise illegal activity . . . . Thus, the non-commercial, non-
inciteful promotion of illegal child pornography, even if repugnant, is protected speech under 
the First Amendment.”). 
 170. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those 
who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be futile . . . .”), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969). 
 171. See id. (“[D]iscussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination 
of noxious doctrine . . . .”). 
 172. See id. at 373 (noting that fundamental rights such as free speech are not necessarily 
absolute rights). 
 173. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the government may restrict free speech in cases of clear and imminent danger to 
the country); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1979) 
(threatening to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent the publication of an article containing 
secrets of hydrogen bomb production if the parties did not settle by a certain date). But see N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (establishing an extremely 
high, though not undefeatable, presumption against prior restraints on expression). 
 174. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). 
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Part II, the Supreme Court does not extend protection to speech that 
is either obscene or contains child pornography.175 
Permitting pandering in the name of First Amendment rights 
unleashes a very powerful force onto a very vulnerable population. 
Even though no objectionable material may be at the root of a 
pander, the pandering itself constitutes the tools for a crime, as it 
heightens interest in child pornography and makes it more likely that 
actual child molestation will take place.176 Pandering gives child 
pornographers unfettered freedom to hawk their wares, secure in the 
knowledge that as long as they possess only the type of material from 
which they could mount a successful affirmative defense (for 
example, virtual child pornography), their pandering will go 
unpunished. 
A child-centered approach to pandering, on the other hand, 
would more effectively shield a vulnerable population from the 
tremendous power of the First Amendment. It would recognize that 
not only the First Amendment, but other essential constitutional 
rights such as justice177 and liberty,178 are implicit in the protection of 
all American constituencies179—perhaps even more poignantly in the 
case of children. The Constitution’s claims to liberty and justice ring 
hollow if they do not extend to protect vulnerable minority 
populations. Indeed, this very concern was on the mind of the 
Constitution’s Framers in crafting the federal government structure to 
prevent against the tyranny of majorities in state legislatures.180 The 
 
 175. See supra Part II.A. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 27–32. 
 177. U.S. CONST. pmbl. A suggestive argument maintains that the words in the Preamble 
are not just empty rhetoric, but ought instead to play a normative role in constitutional 
dialogue, presumably including constitutional adjudication. See Sanford Levinson, Why It’s 
Smart to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 376 (2000) (“If the 
Constitution proclaims to speak in the name of the collective People, then . . . the People should 
engage in a national conversation about whether the Constitution really is a fit instrument for 
achieving the truly inspiring goals set out in the magisterial Preamble. How, indeed, do we 
‘establish Justice’ or ‘assure Domestic tranquility’ or ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty’?”). 
 178. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 179. See Mark S. Kende, Filtering Out Children: The First Amendment and Internet Porn in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 843, 856 (advocating a First Amendment 
approach that weighs the interests of groups like parents and children, rather than purporting to 
use strict scrutiny analysis). 
 180. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 43–44 (2005) 
(recounting James Madison’s ultimately successful efforts in The Federalist Papers to persuade a 
skeptical public that a strong national legislature was necessary to protect the liberties of 
citizens, especially minorities). 
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First Amendment’s guarantee of free expression, powerful as it may 
be, cannot be allowed to override the protection of the laws granted 
to vulnerable groups like children: “Free speech is not so absolute or 
irrational a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective 
protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.”181 
Shifting paradigms toward evaluating pandering based on its 
harm to children will necessarily require reconsideration of a 
particular area of the law—yet such a shift is not without precedent. 
The treatment of rape in the criminal law, for example, has enhanced 
protections for victims by focusing less on their alleged promiscuity.182 
The enactment of “rape shield” laws, prohibiting introduction of a 
victim’s past sexual history to show that it was more likely that the 
victim invited intercourse with the defendant because of a 
promiscuous reputation, is emblematic of a change in attitudes 
regarding the law’s treatment of another vulnerable population 
segment.183 In other words, rape trials have progressed from being 
about the victim to increasingly concerning themselves with the 
defendant’s conduct.184 Although the required paradigm shift in child 
pornography pandering jurisprudence operates in somewhat the 
opposite manner—focusing on the child victims of that pandering, 
instead of shifting away from them—the desired result is the same: 
increasing protection for the more vulnerable of two groups by 
reconsidering the object of that protection. 
Framing the pandering issue as one fundamentally concerning 
children requires, at a basic level, treating children differently than 
panderers—and more worthy of protection—for purposes of 
weighing rights. Yet this attitudinal shift is not unprecedented; the 
 
 181. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 182. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986) (“[C]ourts, in defining the 
crime [of rape], have focused almost incidentally on the defendant—and almost entirely on the 
victim.”). 
 183. See FED. R. EVID. 412 (“The following evidence is not admissible in [almost] any civil 
or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct . . . (1) Evidence offered to prove 
that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any 
alleged victim’s sexual predisposition.”). 
 184. See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 945, 949–50 (2004) (observing that only three states still retained a prompt complaint 
requirement, and then only in spousal sexual offense cases, whereas only three other states 
retained corroboration requirements); see also FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (permitting, in a rule 
enacted in 1995, introduction of evidence that a sexual assault defendant committed past sexual 
assault offenses). 
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law treats children as essentially different in several other ways. 
Minors, for example, lack the capacity to assent to binding 
contracts.185 The law assesses different punishments for juvenile 
offenders than for adults who commit the same crime.186 This area of 
the law, in particular, has also experienced a shift as American society 
has deemed it inappropriate to subject juveniles to the death 
penalty.187 Some states have even authorized capital punishment for 
convicted child molesters.188 At a more quotidian level, minors are not 
allowed to smoke, vote, or drink alcohol before they reach certain 
ages. 
If the law treats children differently in areas that at least 
tangentially concern their safety, then children should also receive the 
benefit of preferential treatment in a small area of First Amendment 
law that directly protects their well-being. Ultimately, this requires 
society to countenance the loss of a small amount of First 
Amendment freedoms—the pandering of purported matter ruled 
illegal and directly linked with harm to children—when drawing the 
line at how far those freedoms may extend. Given the many citizens 
who strongly disapprove of child pornography,189 it is likely that 
overwhelming numbers of people would be comfortable placing 
children far behind that line.190 The Supreme Court has already 
 
 185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981). Those who enter into contracts 
with children may have an expectation interest that the latter will honor their contractual 
obligations—and still be disappointed when the law holds the contract void for lack of capacity. 
The law regards these upset expectations as acceptable in the name of protecting children. 
 186. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 958.04 (LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing alternate sentences 
and prohibiting incarceration in traditional adult facilities for “youthful offenders”). 
 187. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–68 (2005) (holding that a “national 
consensus” of thirty states prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles had emerged, thus 
requiring the total abolition of the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment). 
 188. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7115(I) (2006) (authorizing the death penalty for rape of 
a child under fourteen years old); State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1996) (upholding 
Louisiana’s death penalty law for rape of a victim under twelve years old). Admittedly, 
however, these state laws encounter considerable constitutional difficulties in light of Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty for rape), though 
it is debatable whether Coker was limited to the rape of an adult woman, Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 
1066. 
 189. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 190. In State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007), the chief justice of the Utah Supreme 
Court struggled to define exactly where that line could be drawn in protecting a child from 
polygamous marriage. Maintaining that the state had no business regulating the private conduct 
of a religious practice, Chief Justice Durham “could not uphold Holm’s bigamy conviction on 
the basis that the religiously motivated conduct at issue is inherently harmful to children who 
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indicated its willingness to draw such a protective line; New York v. 
Ferber held that the government has a compelling interest in 
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor.”191 Children are vitally important in the Court’s eyes: “A 
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens . . . .”192 
B. Counterarguments and Responses 
A child-based treatment of pandering provisions is not without 
its potential dangers. For one, it is possible to overplay the extent of 
the problem, and in doing so, inadvertently exacerbate the interest in 
the child pornography market that pandering fuels. The “moral 
panic” phenomenon experienced over sensational, heinous crimes 
such as child kidnappings, brutal murders, or online predation193 may 
lead to positive results (such as enhanced penalties for sex offenders), 
but could also serve to obscure the actual level of threat posed by 
child pornography.194 If a child-centered approach is susceptible to a 
 
grow up in polygamous homes.” Id. at 775–76. That is, consenting adults possessed a freedom, 
based on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), to “choose the nature of their relationships ‘in 
the confines of their homes and their own private lives.’” Holm, 137 P.3d at 776 (quoting 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). But because the defendant had committed unlawful sexual conduct 
with the minor whom he married in a non-state-sanctioned ceremony, id. at 730–31, the chief 
justice would have held that Holm’s bigamy conviction did not violate his Fourteenth 
Amendment claim of individual liberty, id. at 776 n.34. 
For support of the larger point, that a broad swath of society favors the protection of 
children, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 191. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
 192. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). 
 193. In the fall 2006 television lineup, an average of 9.1 million viewers weekly enjoyed 
Dateline NBC’s “To Catch a Predator” series featuring online stalkers of children invited to a 
house where, rather than a submissive child, a television crew and law enforcement officials 
awaited them. Allen Salkin, Web Site Hunts Pedophiles, and TV Goes Along, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 2006, at A1. The proliferation of “To Catch a Predator,” and shows like it, has made 
realizable the peculiarly American dream of “settl[ing] down on your couch for an evening of 
scaring the hell out of yourself over your kids.” James Poniewozik, Breaking America’s Favorite 
Taboo, TIME, Oct. 8, 2006, at 39. 
The intent here is certainly not to trivialize the magnitude of the problem. There is a real 
issue that children do fall victim to child pornography, and are subjected to sexual abuse 
because of it. See supra Part I.A. Nevertheless, responsible treatment of the subject will caution 
against the hyperbolic, emotionally-charged panic that undermines otherwise persuasive 
arguments in favor of curtailing the market for child pornography. 
 194. See Suzanne Ost, Children at Risk: Legal and Societal Perceptions of the Potential 
Threat that the Possession of Child Pornography Poses to Society, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 436, 443–47 
(2002) (documenting British society’s outrage resulting from media coverage of Internet child 
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societal construction of children as innocent, it may actually promote 
more child sex abuse, precisely because abusers are attracted to the 
(pandered) image of the innocent child.195 First Amendment scholar 
Amy Adler posits that merely passing more laws about child 
pornography, or revising existing ones, will not solve the problem if 
the laws force society to regard children as sexual objects in 
evaluating whether certain cases meet the definitions of child 
pornography.196 The treatment of children in child pornography cases 
is paradoxical, Professor Adler argues, because in perceiving a need 
to increase discussion about the prohibited conduct—child sexual 
abuse—society enters a Foucauldian cycle of increased desire to 
engage in that conduct, with some members of society perversely 
choosing to participate in such behavior precisely because it violates a 
norm widely accepted as taboo.197 
Furthermore, carving out a narrow exception for pandering child 
pornography—taking a child-based approach that is not found in 
other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence—could add confusion 
to an already fragmented body of law.198 For a while, courts will 
 
pornography—when the media, in one case, demonstrated a link between child pornography 
and a child’s death—and arguing that such a moral panic could distort the magnitude of the 
actual threat from child pornography). 
 195. See id. at 457–58 (“Our objectification of children as innocent may cause us to reduce 
them simply to objects of innocence, the one aspect of childhood that may be of the greatest 
attraction to the child sexual abuser.”). 
 196. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 264–65 
(2001). 
 197. Id. at 249–51; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Adler 
explicitly references Foucault in countering the commonly-held assumption that talking about a 
problem is the most effective means for its resolution; instead, according to Foucault, the 
communal logorrhea inherent in constantly discussing the problem merely advances a pre-
existing cycle of repression. Adler, supra note 196, at 270–71. For the development of this aspect 
of Foucault’s phenomenology, see generally 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1990) (1978). 
 198. See Adler, supra note 6, at 1000–01 (2001) (arguing that a significant shift in child 
pornography law—regarding child pornography not just as speech, but as action harmful by 
itself—has contributed to making this body of First Amendment law even more incoherent, and 
despairing of finding a coherent theory to First Amendment law). Professor Adler maintains 
that anti-child pornography advocates have conflated the clear semiotic distinction between the 
thing represented (child abuse) and the object that represents it (a pornographic image 
depicting such abuse). Id. at 985–86. But it is not immediately apparent that the distinction is so 
clear: images of child pornography have a pronounced link to abusive sexual conduct with a 
child, see supra text accompanying notes 27–32, a point which even Adler acknowledges. Id. at 
987 (“Child pornography is not just the product of a crime of child abuse. It may sometimes 
serve as an inducement to commit it.”). And although Adler focuses mainly on First 
Amendment overbreadth challenges in defining the content of child pornography, Adler, supra 
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struggle to reassure themselves that they are not merely punishing 
thoughts or fantasies expressing themselves as speech, but are instead 
targeting assertive conduct in the form of words—conduct which 
directly furthers a market that harms children.199 Courts and 
legislatures should adopt limiting provisions to prevent this narrow 
approach from spilling over into other realms of protected speech. 
For instance, adult pornography, and the advertising of it, should not 
be subject to First Amendment restraints merely because children 
could stumble upon it or purposely choose to view it.200 Additionally, 
an adequate test exists for evaluating adult pornography—the 
obscenity test from Miller—that overcomes the hurdles of the First 
Amendment. 
The ambit of the child-centered approach is best cabined from 
the danger of overbroad prohibition of speech (and extension into 
 
note 6, at 961–69, she says nothing about whether statutes prohibiting the pandering of child 
pornography would be susceptible to her criticisms. 
 199. See Adler, supra note 6. at 999–1001 (criticizing the complete elimination of the 
speech/action distinction in child pornography law); see also Robert Post, Recuperating First 
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1995) (postulating that First Amendment 
doctrine is incoherent because it focuses only on words, rather than on action taken in the 
context of the social norms the words embody). 
Axiomatic to American criminal law is the refusal to punish people for their thoughts 
alone. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
convicted sex offender who wandered into a park and admitted to having sexual thoughts about 
the children therein could not constitutionally be punished merely for holding repugnant 
thoughts). Criminal statutes encompass an actus reus requirement because people must 
voluntarily make an affirmative decision to manifest their thoughts through actions. After all, 
the First Amendment provides not only freedom of speech, but also the freedom either to 
express or not express one’s thoughts. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Doe was 
reversed, however, by an en banc Seventh Circuit, which ruled that, in going to the park and 
searching for children to satisfy his sexual cravings, the defendant conducted himself in a 
manner not worthy of protected expression, but rather as a predator. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 
377 F.3d 757, 763–65 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, the defendant was not being punished 
for thought alone but for action resulting from those thoughts which nearly came to child 
molestation. Id. at 766–67. 
 200. There are arguments both for and against this proposition, which are beyond the scope 
of this Note. Compare Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28–29 (1971) (arguing that a majoritarian view of pornography as 
morally polluting should be given wide judicial latitude in evaluating statutes banning 
pornography), and Steven E. Merlis, Note, Preserving Internet Expression While Protecting our 
Children: Solutions After Ashcroft v. ACLU, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 117, 126–31 
(2005) (proposing increased use of filtering software and “cyber zoning” to restrict pornography 
to certain Internet domains), with Svetlana Mintcheva, Protection or Politics? The Use and 
Abuse of Children, in CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO FREE 
EXPRESSION, supra note 6, at 167 (submitting that a perceived “need” to protect children from 
viewing pornographic material merely amounts to further censorship). 
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other arenas of constitutional interpretation that do not beg for such 
an approach) by explicit statutory requirements that panderers 
possess actual pornographic content. Such a linguistic link already 
exists in state statutes; Ohio does not permit anyone to “[k]nowingly 
solicit, receive, purchase, exchange, possess, or control any material 
that shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual activity, 
masturbation, or bestiality . . . .”201 whereas Kentucky requires actual 
knowledge that the material in question is child pornography: 
A person is guilty of advertising material portraying a sexual 
performance by a minor when, having knowledge of its content and 
character thereof, he or she writes or creates advertising or solicits 
anyone to publish such advertising or otherwise promotes the sale or 
distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor.202 
This type of textual requirement of a panderer’s possession or 
knowledge of actual child pornographic material has withstood 
constitutional challenges in the state courts.203 Although a statute 
prohibiting even non-content-based panders would go the furthest in 
quelling the market for child pornography, such textual content 
requirements in the federal statutes would accomplish much of that 
goal without running afoul of overbreadth doctrine. 
In operation, the philosophical change engendered by a child-
centered pandering provision would address these potential 
objections. It would recognize that the protection of children from a 
means of solicitation that furthers the potential for their harm is even 
more compelling than the First Amendment right of self-expression. 
A child-centered pandering provision would provide an explicit 
statutory link to actual content and express recognition of the 
legislative purpose to protect children.204 Such a provision would 
 
 201. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322(A)(5) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added). 
 202. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.360(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added). 
 203. See State v. Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697, 704–05 (Ohio 1986) (holding that, given the 
state’s compelling interest in protecting children, § 2907.322(A)(5) does not violate the First 
Amendment); State v. Eichorn, No. 02 CA 953, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3101, at *14 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 27, 2003) (declining to find § 2907.322(A)(5) overbroad). But see State v. Tooley, No. 
2004-P-0064, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6032, *21 & n.37 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2005) 
(disagreeing with at least three other state appellate districts in holding § 2907.322(A)(5) 
unconstitutional), rev’d, State v. Tooley, Nos. 2006-0105 & 2006-0216, 2007 Ohio LEXIS 1655 
(Ohio July 25, 2007). 
 204. For a promising model statute, see Brian G. Glass, Note, Protecting Children and 
Expression: Towards Better Tailored Child Pornography Laws, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 
495 (2001) (“No person shall produce, promote, distribute, view or possess sexual material that 
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eschew the punishment of mere thoughts or fantasies that is 
anathema to the freedom to think as one chooses.205 It would treat 
pandering as a tool, and as conduct inextricably incident to crime, 
rather than the mere expression of thoughts. And it would reduce the 
available means by which those who possess illegal child 
pornography, or those who encourage them, perpetuate the harm 
done to children. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress recognized a problem when it saw it. Consequently, 
Congress made good-faith efforts to establish that the pandering of 
child pornography furthered the market for illegal pornographic 
material. In so doing, it substantiated the nexus between those who 
consume child pornography and those who abuse children. Congress 
drafted its legislation based on extensive testimony and data from 
numerous experts, and on the justification that a broad social norm 
had coalesced against the market for exploitative child pornography. 
Yet each proposed solution contained the potential to hamper rights 
of self-expression, and given the First Amendment’s powerful 
purchase on the ability to express oneself in the manner most 
reflective of one’s conscience, expression won out in the balancing of 
rights performed by American courts. 
The appropriate frame of reference in evaluating this category of 
competing rights claims must center on the object of the most 
significant harm—the child. Yet the institutions responsible for 
shaping the law that protects this vulnerable group have not 
embraced this orientation. If courts and legislatures focus on children 
as the beneficiaries of the law’s protection, they will find that 
pandering of child pornography is not just speech; it is a tool used by 
molesters, pedophiles, and others who possess base motives vis-à-vis 
children to facilitate their crimes. This recognition, coupled with the 
corollary emphasis on protecting children, is the constitutional 
 
a reasonable person . . . would believe has caused and continues to cause direct harm to an 
individual child or to an identifiable class of children.”). 
 205. See Clay Calvert, Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasies, and the Fundamental 
Human Right to Hold Deviant Ideas: Why the Seventh Circuit Got it Wrong in Doe v. City of 
Lafayette, Indiana, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 135 (2005) (arguing that the First Amendment ought 
to protect all manner of thoughts, as long as they do not end up in criminal conduct or in 
absolutely unprotected expression like violence or obscenity). This Note has attempted to show 
that the pandering of child pornography can end up in both. 
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imperative of society’s commitment, at its most ideal, to use the law 
to seek true justice. 
